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This paper examines the economic logic of organising field technicians into self-managed 
teams, an approach to work organisation that shifts the division of labour from a hierarchical to 
horizontal one. Economic efficiencies arise through the integration of direct and indirect labour 
tasks and the alignment of the organisational structure with the occupational logic of 
communities of practice among technicians. Self-managed teams absorb the monitoring and co-
ordination tasks of supervisors, substantially reducing indirect labour costs but without adversely 
affecting objective measures of quality and labour productivity. For technicians, team 
membership means longer work hours, but higher wages through overtime pay. 
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THE ECONOMICS OF TEAMS AMONG TECHNICIANS 
1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, research on teams has shown that the use of self-managed or 
autonomous teams is associated with improvements in work-related attitudes, behaviours, and 
performance (Beekun, 1989; Bettenhausen, 1991; Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Cordery et al., 1991; 
Guzzo and Dickson, 1996; Pearce and Ravlin, 1987; Wall et al., 1986). Most prior research, 
however, has failed to examine the economic efficiencies of teams. Even when researchers have 
analysed objective performance outcomes, they have failed to consider labour inputs, or cost-
adjusted outcomes. For example, do the benefits of teams outweigh the costs of up-front and on-
going investment in team meetings or training? If team members absorb the tasks previously 
done by supervisors, do the workers devote less time to direct production? 
This lack of attention to economic efficiencies may be due to the fact that most research 
on teams uses a psychological or behavioural paradigm and focuses on teams as the unit of 
analysis. By doing so, researchers fail to capture the full range of changes in the division of 
labour and how the shift to team-based systems affects the economic efficiencies in the 
production system as a whole. Self-managed teams redefine the division of labour by shifting 
hierarchical relations to horizontal ones. In theory, they make the whole system more efficient 
by integrating direct and indirect functions into a coherent whole. 
In addition, few studies have examined the economic costs and benefits of teams for 
workers relative to management (exceptions include Weisman et al., 1993; Appelbaum et al., 
2000). While many studies have examined intrinsic outcomes such as the quality of worklife 
(QWL) or job satisfaction (see, for example, Wall et al. 1986), and a handful have considered 
stress and peer-group pressure (see, for example, Barker, 1993), few have quantified extrinsic 
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outcomes such as wages and work hours. Do workers in teams, for example, receive higher 
wages or overtime pay? Do they absorb additional tasks by working smarter, faster, or longer? 
This paper focuses on the economic costs and benefits of self-managed teams, defined as 
groups of individuals who are semi-autonomous or largely self-managing, who are 
interdependent and are perceived by others as a group, and who have significant relations with 
other groups in a larger system (Hackman, 1987). It contributes to the research on teams in 
several ways. First, I examine economic efficiencies in the production system as a whole and 
show how this approach (rather than a team unit of analysis) produces more meaningful results. I 
compare objective performance outcomes and the allocation of direct and indirect labour in 
systems that use self-managed teams versus traditionally supervised groups. Second, I analyse 
the distribution of costs and benefits associated with self-managed teams: I compare the costs 
and benefits of teams for management to the wage and hour outcomes for workers. Third, I 
examine self-managed teams among technical workers -- an understudied occupation that is 
among the fastest growing and one that is especially important for knowledge-based economies. 
I use qualitative field research to interpret the quantitative results. I conclude by discussing how 
the approach used in this study can be applied more generally to other contexts. 
This paper considers these questions through a study of 230 technicians in a stratified 
random sample of self-managed and traditionally supervised groups in a large U.S. 
telecommunications company. The subjects are field technicians who install and maintain 
network transmission and switching equipment for a regional Bell operating company (RBOC). 
In traditional hierarchies, the supervisor is responsible for co-ordination and monitoring of 
geographically dispersed work groups. Under a self-managed team organisation, the supervisor 
is removed; and technicians as a team take responsibility for their geographic area. 
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2. Alternative Theoretical Frameworks 
Research on Teams and High Performance Systems 
The lack of attention to economic analyses of teams is evident in existing reviews of the 
literature. In a meta-analysis of 131 North American field studies between 1961 and 1991, for 
example, Macy and Izumi found that the evidence on the economics of change efforts was scarce 
and unreliable, with only 16 studies (12%) including any measures of economic cost (1993: 
238). More recently, Cohen and Bailey (1997) reviewed fifty-four studies of teams in 
organisational context published between 1990 and 1996. They found that most studies analysed 
outcomes along multiple dimensions (e.g., attitudes, behaviours, subjective and/or objective 
measures of quality or quantity), but only one (Pearson, 1992), considered labour productivity 
and only one (Weisman et al., 1993), wage outcomes. 
The economic pay-off to teams has figured more prominently in the literature on "high 
involvement" or "high performance" work systems -- systems in which firms invest in skills and 
training, employee participation in teams, and HR incentives such as employment security and 
performance-based pay (see Ichniowski et al., 1996; Wood, 1999). Even these studies, however, 
usually do not include labour-cost adjusted outcomes or analyses of the allocation of direct and 
indirect labour. Moreover, the few that have examined wage outcomes provide mixed results. 
For example, Appelbaum et al. (2000) found that workers in some high performance plants 
enjoyed higher wages, while Osterman (2000) found that workers in high performance plants 
had no higher wages and were significantly more likely to experience layoffs. 
Three perspectives from the high performance literature, however, are relevant to the 
current study. First, from an economic perspective, we need to understand production 
efficiencies at a system level. Studies at the team unit of analysis usually explain performance in 
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terms of worker motivation and behaviour. From an economic perspective, what matters is the 
performance of the production system as a whole, including both direct and indirect labour. 
Second, the high performance literature shows that the nature of teams varies widely. 
Teams vary in the extent to which they have substantive versus consultative decision-making 
responsibilities (Levine and Tyson, 1990); whether they are the fundamental unit of work 
organisation (that is, on-line teams) or parallel to that work organisation (that is, "offline") 
(Cotton, 1993; Rubenstein, 2000); and whether they are used to alter the broader organisational 
structure. For example, while teams in lean production systems are embedded in vertical 
hierarchies of co-ordination and control (Adler, 1993), those inspired by socio-technical systems 
(STS) theory involve greater decentralisation and a shift to horizontal relations of collaboration 
and co-ordination (Berggren, 1992; Appelbaum and Batt, 1994). 
Third, the economic value of teams must be understood in specific industry and 
occupational contexts. While growing evidence suggests that team-based systems produce better 
performance in general, research also suggests that the potential for and rationale behind 
performance gains is contingent on industry and technological context (Appelbaum et. al, 2000; 
Becker and Gerhart, 1996; Whitfield and Poole, 1997; Wood, 1999). For example, in steel mills, 
the huge capital outlays in advanced technology mean that machine uptime is the critical 
performance metric; it is particularly the communication of workers across miles of steel mills 
that leads to better machine utilisation (Appelbaum et al., 2000). In apparel, it is multi-skilling 
in self-managed teams that leads to improved throughput time and allows firms to compete on 
the basis of quick response to market demand (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Abernathy et al., 1999). 
6 
The Rationale for Self-managed Teams Among Technicians 
The use of teams among field technicians differs in at least two important ways from their use 
among blue collar manufacturing workers. First, manufacturing plants typically have used teams 
to increase the breadth of tasks and individual discretion of low-skilled workers in jobs that were 
successfully taylorised, or rationalised, under mass production. The jobs of field technicians, 
however, were never successfully rationalised. Given that technicians already have considerable 
skill and discretion, the use of self-managed teams is likely to produce only modest changes in 
the design of technicians' direct labour tasks. 
Second, given high levels of "technically-required interdependence” in manufacturing 
(Cummings, 1978), team-based systems in factory settings improve performance because they 
allow production workers to solve problems over an entire process, rather than a piece of it. The 
work of field technicians, by contrast, requires much less interdependence. Technicians, for 
example, often work autonomously to install or repair equipment on the premises of individual 
customers. Thus, it is not readily apparent why technicians should perform better if organised 
into formal teams. In fact, ethnographic research suggests that technicians already create their 
own informal "communities of practice," regardless of the formal organisational structure in 
which they are embedded (Orr, 1996). The field technicians in the current study of 
telecommunications are very similar to the xerox field technicians in Orr's study. He argues that 
the technicians should be viewed as an occupational community (Van Maanen and Barley, 
1984), rather than an organisational one. Despite the fact that their work locations are 
geographically dispersed, Orr's xerox technicians met regularly over coffee to discuss their work 
and confer with each other. Informal teams also characterise the organisation of technical work 
in a variety of lab settings (Barley, 1996). In sum, field technicians already have the skills, 
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discretion, and independence to do their job, to learn from each other, and to work co-operatively 
where necessary. Why should formal self-managed teams make a difference in this context? 
Viewed from the perspective of teams as the unit of analysis, the organisation of 
technical work via self-managed teams might merely formalise what they are already doing. The 
production system as a whole, however, involves the effective performance of both direct and 
indirect labour functions. In technical services, there is reason to believe that the economic 
benefits of self-managed teams lie more in the effective execution of indirect tasks. Indirect 
tasks in these settings are non-trivial, and include the two dimensions of co-ordination and 
monitoring. Co-ordination tasks involve the allocation of labour among technicians who work in 
widely dispersed locations, which I refer to as internal co-ordination, as well as co-ordination 
across networks of actors -- workers in different departments, suppliers, and customers -- or 
external co-ordination. The tasks of monitoring are also considerable because checks are not 
easily built into the technical system as in manufacturing. Monitoring includes the tasks of 
inspection, documentation, reporting, and responding to customer complaints. It also includes 
technical assistance to correct problems found or to respond to changes in technology, staffing, 
customers, or market conditions. Thus, co-ordination and monitoring involve a series of tasks 
that are time-consuming and important for the effective maintenance of the technical 
infrastructure. Thus, the use of self-managed teams among technicians appears to formalise their 
already existing autonomy with regard to direct production tasks, but introduces for the first time 
the indirect tasks of co-ordination and monitoring that are usually performed by supervisors in 
hierarchical organisations. 
Self-managed teams are likely to improve organisational efficiency because they shift the 
division of labour from a hierarchical to a horizontal one. Under vertical hierarchies, technicians 
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are responsible for direct tasks and managers, indirect tasks of co-ordination and monitoring. 
This creates an anomaly because technicians work under the logic of occupational or horizontal 
communities, but are embedded in large-scale organisations where hierarchical control is the 
organising principle (see, for example, Barley, 1996:429). Economic inefficiencies arise 
because the principles of work in technicians' occupational communities are at odds with the 
logic of vertical hierarchies: 
"Most technicians work in organizations that routinely attempt to fold technicians into a 
vertical division of labor via formal job classifications, graded pay scales, and related human 
resource practices. Yet technicians remain strongly oriented to their community of practice. 
Moreover, technical work routinely undermines bureaucratic systems of control and 
stipulated roles because technicians' expertise and knowledge is a critical resource which few 
outsiders possess. Thus, technicians' work brings the underpinnings of an occupational 
division of labor directly to the core of well-established organizational divisions of labour" 
(Whalley and Barley, 1997:49-50). 
Under self-managed teams, by contrast, co-ordination is likely to be more efficient for 
two reasons. First, third-party transactions costs are eliminated. For example, direct 
communication between technicians and subject matter experts in other departments (external 
co-ordination) is more efficient than bringing a third party (supervisor) into the loop. Second, 
technicians have much greater technical expertise than supervisors, whose skills often become 
obsolete because of on-going technology change. For example, compared to supervisors, 
technicians are in a better position to allocate tasks because they know the equipment, customers, 
and field problems, and which technician is best able to service particular customers or 
machines. Similarly, technicians' direct knowledge of the equipment puts them in a better 
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position to respond to customer complaints. These arguments also apply to monitoring and 
technical assistance because supervisors' skill obsolescence renders them less able to provide 
technicians with technical assistance. Peer monitoring and assistance is already embedded in the 
communities of practice described by Orr, Barley, and others. Getting rid of supervisors, 
therefore, should improve technical efficiency and eliminate unnecessary indirect costs. 
Existing research on technicians, therefore, suggests that the use of self-managed teams 
should create economic efficiencies by aligning the organisational structure with the logic of 
technicians occupational skills and work practices. Work organised into self-managed teams 
should not simply formalise what already exists, but rather change the production system by 
taking indirect support functions in hierarchical organisations and incorporating them into the 
conduct of daily work in horizontal organisations. 
The question of how self-managed teams influence the use of direct labour among 
technicians is less straightforward, involving competing factors. On the one hand, self-managed 
teams may have a positive effect on the conduct of direct labour tasks, especially if the 
organisational structure prevents occupational communities of practice from operating 
effectively. According to Whalley and Barley, for example, technicians routinely characterise 
management and hierarchy as undermining their work (1997:44). This might occur if 
supervisors with less expertise than technicians typically seek to wield their authority or give 
misguided orders, or if they disrupt direct lines of communication between technicians and other 
departments. Another example comes from Bailyn et al. (1999), who found that a product 
development team was running behind schedule in part because higher managers, who were 
worried about meeting deadlines, kept interrupting the team members when they were working. 
Eliminating the supervisor also may allow workers to feel a greater sense of freedom to pursue 
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their own initiative, thereby increasing motivation and a sense of pride and responsibility at 
work. Finally, some research suggests that peer monitoring in self-managed teams is a more 
powerful mechanism of control than hierarchical monitoring, inducing workers to work harder in 
order to meet self-imposed group norms and rules (Barker, 1993). 
On the other hand, to the extent that technicians spend additional time with customers 
and suppliers, in meetings, or on inspections and reports, they may spend less time on direct 
labour activity. Unless technicians work longer hours, their direct labour productivity (usually 
measured in terms of customers served per day) may actually fall. Another line of reasoning, 
derived from agency theory (Alchien and Demsetz, 1972), is that technicians freed from the 
monitoring of a supervisor are more likely to shirk, taking more time for coffee breaks or 
personal time. If hierarchical monitoring is more effective than peer monitoring in extracting 
greater effort, then direct labour productivity may fall under team-based systems. 
In sum, the hypothesised relationship between self-managed teams and indirect labour 
costs is negative. The relationship between the use of teams and direct labour productivity of 
technicians, by contrast, is the net result of competing factors. A key empirical question 
concerns the magnitude of savings associated with self-managed teams. 
The Distribution of Costs and Benefits of Teams 
A further issue is the distribution of relative costs and benefits of workplace innovations 
for firms and workers. As noted above, most studies of workplace innovations estimate 
performance benefits without analysing outcomes of interest to workers, such as wages, work 
hours, or job security. Yet, the sustainability of innovations is likely to depend on whether 
employees realise some share in performance gains. The distribution of costs and benefits will 
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depend on contextual factors, such as whether workers and management have negotiated an 
explicit agreement as in gain-sharing plans, pay-for-skill plans, or pay for additional tasks. 
In the absence of such an agreement, as is true in this case and many others, the outcomes 
for workers are more ambiguous. To the extent that firms seek to reduce labour costs by shifting 
supervisors' responsibilities to lower paid workers, there may be pressure on workers to do more 
work in less time. Another alternative is that employees will work longer hours and receive 
overtime pay (Weisman et al., 1993). If overtime work is voluntary, then workers may view 
longer hours as an opportunity and a benefit. If it is involuntary, then workers may gain higher 
wages but at the expense of time devoted to family or personal life. In the context of the current 
case, overtime was voluntary and most technicians valued it as a means to increase their income. 
To assess outcomes for workers in this case, I compare the work and overtime hours of 
technicians in self-managed and traditional work groups, and then estimate associated overtime 
pay. 
3. Methods 
The research for this study combined observation of workers, interviews at multiple levels of the 
organisation, individual surveys, and archival data on performance matched to the individual 
surveys. The observation and field interviews contributed to understanding the tasks and skill 
requirements of technicians' work, the differences in responsibilities of technicians in self-
managed versus traditional groups, and occupation-specific performance measures. The choice 
of a quantitative study in one company helps to control for variation in firm-level variables such 
as corporate culture, business strategy, and human resource (HR) policies. A union contract also 
reduced variation in HR practices (e.g., seniority-based job bidding, compensation). For the 
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remainder of the paper, I refer to the self-managed teams as teams and traditionally supervised 
groups as traditional groups. 
Organisational Context 
The company in this case is a large regional Bell operating company (RBOC) in the 
United States that undertook work innovations in anticipation of heightened competition under 
deregulated local markets. In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Telecommunications Act, 
which opened local markets to competition. In anticipation of deregulation, the company and 
union in this study negotiated a voluntary self-managed team initiative as a vehicle for 
improving quality and customer service. The labour-management agreement specified 
guidelines for which tasks would be absorbed by the teams. The program was voluntary; 
technicians as a group could vote to become self-managed. They received no additional pay, but 
according to field interviews, technicians liked the freedom from supervision and the ability to 
run their own geographic turf; they also liked the fact that they were less likely to be pulled from 
their own area to work in another area. Management operated under the theory that each team 
would take responsibility for a given geographic area, and that the team's sense of responsibility 
and knowledge of customers, in turn, would provide incentives for more preventative 
maintenance and better service. 
Field research for this study showed that the nature of work among telecommunications 
technicians is very similar to that described in ethnographic research on other types of 
technicians (see, for example, Orr, 1996; Barley and Orr, 1997). For example, they have highly 
specialised skills, work independently to install and maintain equipment in dispersed field 
locations on customer premises, and have daily routines that help create communities of practice, 
for example, through informal meetings at coffee shops or in the field. 
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Under the self-managed system in this case, the field technicians performed a series of 
indirect labour functions traditionally done by supervisors, including internal and external co-
ordination and monitoring. First, they were responsible for allocating work among themselves 
and for ensuring timely completion of jobs. Second, they managed a network of external 
relationships: they interfaced with customers to bring in jobs or handle complaints, contacted 
suppliers to order supplies, negotiated with other managers over turf responsibilities, worked 
with engineering and provisioning for new plant and equipment, and interacted with power 
companies for co-ordination of joint-use poles (poles used by both the telephone and power 
companies). Third, they assumed monitoring tasks, including on-site quality and safety 
inspections, reporting, and technical assistance. Safety monitoring and training are an important 
part of indirect support tasks because of historic regulation and scrutiny of an industry where 
electric transmission systems pose significant hazards. The self-managed teams incorporated 
many of these tasks into their day to day work. They also elected a rotating team leader who 
spent one day per week on paperwork, including filling out reports, responding to customer 
complaints, and following up on other co-ordination functions as needed. 
Data 
The data consist of a stratified random sample of field technicians in a nine-state region 
in the United States. I created the sample by first including all existing self-managed teams; 
then, for each such team, I randomly selected a traditional group that worked under the same 
district (middle) manager. The sampling strategy produced similar numbers of teams and 
traditional groups by state and by local service market (e.g., urban, suburban, rural; residential 
and business customers), except that I over-sampled the traditional groups because of small 
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numbers. A random subset of employees in each team or group received surveys, and 58% 
responded for a total of 466 surveys. 
The quantitative analysis of economic outcomes is based on matching respondent surveys 
with individual performance data from the company's computer-based measurement system, 
which tracked the number of dispatches per technician and the resolution of those dispatches. 
The performance data include individual monthly data for a 17-month period in 1993 and 1994. 
Of the 466 surveys, matching performance data was available for 230 cases because some states 
were not fully participating in the information system. Also, the original survey included 
technicians who worked in central offices or engineering where different performance metrics 
were used. Usable data for the performance model include 102 technicians from 45 teams and 
128 technicians from 49 traditional groups. A comparison of the survey responses of employees 
with and without matched performance data shows that the latter group was different only with 
respect to service market characteristics (customer geographic location), which are controlled for 
in the analyses below. 
One methodological question concerns the appropriate time period for comparing the 
survey data (which captures team characteristics) and the performance data. The performance 
data covers the period of January, 1993 to May, 1994. The survey was administered in February, 
1994. My interpretation of the survey is that it captures fairly stable team characteristics. 
According to survey responses, only 1 team member reported that he had been in his team for 
less than 1 year. In addition, of the 45 teams, 37 were formed between 1985 and 1992; 7 were 
formed in early 1993; and 1 at the beginning of 1994 (for this team, only the 1994 performance 
data was used). In field interviews, workers said that it usually took a couple of months for the 
team to learn how to absorb the supervisory tasks. Thus, even for the 1993 teams, they would 
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have been acting like a team for most of 1993. I created averages of the performance data on a 
quarterly basis, 6-month basis, and for the entire 17-month period. Where missing data existed, 
the average is based on the months for which data was available. The results using data for 
different time periods were not significantly different, so I report the results below using 
averages for the 17-month period. 
Measures 
Three variables capture work organisation and technology. Team membership is a 
dummy variable (1 represents membership in a team, else traditional group). Multi-skilling is an 
additive index of the number of different types of jobs routinely performed by the technician 
(such as installation, repair, splicing, etc.). Technology is the technician's estimate of the 
percentage of equipment he or she works with that is modernised so that the time and complexity 
for repairing twisted cable is considerably reduced. Other measures of technological 
modernisation such as the percentage of copper cable that the technician normally works with 
produced similar results in equations, and are not included here. 
I included 5 types of supportive HR practices because prior literature suggests that team 
outcomes are likely to be contingent on other managerial practices and support (see, for example, 
Lawler, 1986; Arthur, 1992; Ichniowski et al., 1996). The HR practices identified in the high 
involvement literature include off-line problem solving or total quality improvement groups, 
training, supportive managers, opportunities for advancement, and high relative pay. In this 
study, total quality group is dummy variable, where 1 equals participation in an offline problem-
solving group, else 0. Training is an additive index of the number of days of formal training 
received in the 2 years prior to the survey. Supportive management is a six-item scale that 
measures employees' perceptions of their supervisor (coach) regarding feedback, respect for 
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employees, fairness, provision of resources and time, and support for quality (Cronbach's alpha = 
.85). Skill advancement opportunities is one question that asks the technician's perception of 
opportunities to improve his or her skills (scale 1-5). Annual earnings are captured by earnings 
brackets, transformed into the natural log form. 
Dependent variables include measures of supervisory tasks, the quantity and distribution 
of work hours, labour productivity, and objective measures of quality. Supervisory tasks include 
two dimensions of co-ordination (internal and external) and two dimensions of monitoring 
(conducting inspections and providing technical assistance). Internal co-ordination is a scale 
based on five questions that ask how much responsibility technicians have for handling group 
goals, tasks, schedules, breaks, and absences (scale 1-4, Cronhach's alpha = .74). External co-
ordination is a single question that asks technicians how frequently they contact managers, 
experts, and others outside of their department to get their job done (scale of 1-5). Inspections is 
a scale based on two questions that ask technicians how much responsibility they have for 
quality and safety inspections (scale 1-4, Cronbach's alpha = .85). Technical assistance is a 1-5 
scale that asks how frequently technicians help one another with short cuts and problem solving. 
Measures of work hours and productivity were computed from monthly data in five 
categories: a) direct productive labour (hours spent doing service installation and repair); b) 
unproductive labour, which includes both indirect labour (e.g., meetings and training) and paid 
time off (vacation, sick leave); c) overtime (over 40 hours per week); d) total work hours (the 
sum of the prior three categories); and e) number of dispatches that each employee completed. 
Time in meetings, training, and paid time off is defined as unproductive because it does not 
contribute to direct labour activity. From the hours and dispatch data, I constructed two 
measures of labour productivity: productive hours per dispatch per month and total hours per 
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dispatch per month. Quality indicators at the individual technician level were of two types: a) 
missed appointments per month (the number of times a technician missed an appointment when 
given adequate time to meet it), and b) multiple dispatches per month (the number of times that a 
technician required additional assistance on a job). No customer satisfaction data was available 
because the company collected it at a higher level of aggregation than the individual work group. 
Control variables are: a) employment relations climate (two questions on co-operation 
between labour and management and between co-workers; b) demographic characteristics (age, 
gender, years of education, and company tenure); and c) service market characteristics (state 
location; rural, urban, and suburban location; and residential versus business customers). 
4. Results 
To gain an initial assessment of the similarities and differences of technicians in self-managed 
and traditional groups, I first estimated the means and standard deviations of variables for all 
employees, for those in teams, and for those in traditional groups (Table 1). The data show that 
the sample is very homogenous, as expected, given that this workforce is a stable, unionised one 
in a company that had not undergone major downsizing or restructuring prior to the time of the 
study. The average age of technicians is 45, with a standard deviation of 5.47. Ninety-six 
percent of the workforce is male and 92 percent is Caucasian. Skill levels are moderately high, 
with 98 percent of the sample having at least a high school education and 65 percent at least 1 
year of post-secondary college or technical training. Average tenure with the company is 22 
years, with a standard deviation of 5.2. Eighty-nine percent of the sample are union members 
(the company operated in states with right to work laws that allow employees to decide whether 
or not they want to join the union that has been elected to represent all workers in the 
workplace). This sample is representative of employees in the traditional Bell system more 
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generally, where strong internal labour markets and historic employment security created a very 
stable, highly skilled, and homogenous, Caucasian workforce (for a further discussion of internal 
labour markets in the Bell system, see Keefe and Batt, 1997). 
The average technician worked 204 hours per month, or 47.2 hours per week. Monthly 
hours include 157 hours of direct labour time, 15 hours of indirect/unproductive time, and 31 
hours of overtime. These data are consistent with reports from field interviews, which indicated 
there was widespread use of overtime. Labour productivity averaged 2.36 hours per customer 
per employee, also consistent with reports from the field. This total takes into account 
residential service calls that are usually quite short as well as those to businesses that are much 
longer. It also includes driving time, which is considerable in this sample (averaging 1.8 hours 
per day) due to the high percentage of technicians serving residential and rural populations. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The technicians in teams and traditional groups are similar along many dimensions. 
They are similar in their demographic characteristics, in their total work hours and overtime, in 
their objective quality and productivity measures, and in most dimensions of human resource and 
industrial relations practices (use of new technology, participation in offline problem-solving, 
advancement opportunities, earnings, labour-management relations, and union membership 
levels). 
Teams and traditional groups differ significantly, however, with respect to work tasks, 
work hours, training, and employment relations. Technicians in teams are significantly more 
likely to absorb supervisory tasks of internal and external co-ordination and monitoring 
(inspections and technical assistance). On average they clocked in about 2 hours per month less 
productive time and about one and one-half hours more indirect/unproductive time. They had 
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more overtime hours, although the mean differences are not significant. Teams also reported 
significantly more multi-skilling, more formal training (which is primarily team related training), 
less support from management, and better relations with co-workers. 
In the multivariate analyses that follow, I control for these differences. That is, I control 
for other parts of the human resource system -- dimensions of work that are likely to co-vary 
with the introduction of teams (such as multi-skilling, team related training, and the reduction in 
support from the supervisor). Thus, my approach produces a conservative estimate of outcomes 
associated with team-based systems because it captures the differences resulting from the 
structure of teamwork alone. Also, there are significant differences in the service markets in 
which teams and traditional groups are located, so that controlling for market characteristics is 
important as these are likely to have a significant effect on productivity and quality. 
The simple means tests suggest that the team structure does influence what technicians 
do and how they allocate their work time. To probe these results more carefully, I conducted a 
series of multivariate analyses that control for other potential explanations for differences 
between technicians in teams and traditional groups. I used ordinary least squares regressions 
and ordered probit analyses (where appropriate) for the dependent variables of interest. In all 
regression analyses I used a Huber correction technique (Huber 1967) because individuals were 
randomly sampled within traditional groups, a violation of OLS assumptions of independence of 
observations. Where cluster sampling exists, as in this case, the Huber technique assumes that 
observations are independent across groups, but not within groups. The alternative variance 
estimator takes into account the correlations within groups, and thereby produces more robust 
standard errors. Each regression includes the independent and control variables along with an 
indicator variable for the team or group to which the observation belongs. For two of the 
20 
dependent variables in Table 2 (external co-ordination and technical assistance), I used an 
ordered probit via a maximum likelihood technique because the dependent variable is measured 
on a 5-item multinomial scale. 
Each of the analyses uses the same set of independent and control variables, but 
substitutes different dependent variables. Table 2 reports the results using the four supervisory 
tasks as the dependent variables. This analysis provides quantitative support for the qualitative 
evidence that the structure of tasks and routines in self-managed teams is significantly different 
than that found in traditional groups. After controlling for other potential sources of variance, 
the analysis shows that technicians in teams are significantly more likely than those in traditional 
groups to assume responsibility for all four types of indirect or supervisory tasks. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The next question concerns whether absorption of supervisory tasks affects team 
members' work hours, and the results of regression analyses suggest that it does (Table 3). 
Compared to workers in traditional groups, team members average about 2 fewer productive 
hours per month. This finding of less time in productive hours (and simultaneously more time in 
unproductive hours) is consistent with field interviews with technicians in teams who said they 
hold regular meetings to organise the way they work together, and received more initial and on-
going training than when they worked under traditional supervision. Analysis of the data by 
month and by quarter (not shown) shows that no particular time period accounts for these 
differences. Team members also, on average, work 6 more overtime hours per employee per 
month. These findings, taken in conjunction with those in Table 2, suggest that members of 
teams absorb supervisory tasks by working fewer productive hours and more overtime hours. 
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It is also noteworthy that offline total quality meetings are much more time-consuming 
than self-managed team meetings. Employees who participate in offline meetings have 3.2 
fewer hours of direct time per month. About equal percentages of technicians in traditional 
groups (18 percent) and self-managed teams (21 percent) participated in offline team meetings. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
An important follow-up question is whether technicians in teams and traditional groups 
differ with respect to direct labour productivity and quality (Table 4). In this case, the data 
reveal no significant differences in direct labour performance based on team membership. Multi-
skilling and participation in TQM similarly have no relationship to objective performance 
measures. An analysis of the data by month and by quarter (not shown) shows no significant 
differences from these findings. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results thus far indicate that technicians in teams differ significantly from those in 
traditional groups in their absorption of indirect labour tasks and in their work hours; but they do 
not differ significantly in terms of objective measures of labour productivity or service quality. 
The next question is to translate these findings into labour efficiency at the level of the 
production unit in order to compare the relative efficiency of the team-based versus traditional 
work system. If technicians in teams absorb the work of supervisors, which system --- a 
horizontal or hierarchical division of labour -- is more efficient? One way to assess this 
question is to compare the time it takes team members as a group to do the work of the 
supervisor they replace. The previous analysis shows that, compared to technicians in traditional 
groups, those in teams work 2 hours per month less in direct labour and 6.0 hours more in 
overtime -- a difference of 8 hours per member per month. As a first approximation, I will 
22 
assume that this time represents the time to complete the added tasks of co-ordination and 
monitoring, an assumption that is consistent with qualitative evidence from field interviews. In 
field interviews, team members said that they typically met each morning to assign tasks and co-
ordinate activities. In addition, one team member served as the lead member, and this position 
rotated on a monthly or bimonthly basis. The lead person worked in direct customer service 4 
days a week and would take about 1 day per week to handle quality and safety reports and other 
paperwork previously handled by the supervisor. The lead would handle most customer 
complaints and some of the interface with other departments over turf responsibilities, or co-
ordination in pre-survey work or construction projects. In addition, each team member also 
assumed some tasks of external co-ordination. 
To compare the work time of technicians in teams to that of traditional supervisors, I 
estimated the savings associated with the typical self-managed team. Both the median and mean 
size of teams is eight members. According to the data, each team member spent roughly 8 hours 
per month on co-ordination and monitoring, or 64 hours per month per team (8 hours/member*8 
members per team) to absorb supervisory tasks. A typical full-time supervisor works 174 hours 
per month (40 hours/week*4.3 weeks/month). However, supervisors also routinely worked 
overtime, and were paid a straight hourly wage for that time. Supervisors that I surveyed 
reported working about 40 hours per month in overtime. Data from the corporate Human 
Resources Department showed that supervisors actually received an average of 26 hours per 
month in overtime pay. This amount is less than what the supervisors reported for two reasons. 
First, supervisors’ self-reports may be somewhat inflated. Second, the company had a cap on the 
amount of overtime hours it was willing to pay for supervisors (companies are not legally 
required to pay supervisors any overtime pay because supervisors are defined as exempt from 
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coverage under United States’ wage and hour laws). I used the company data because it 
provides a more accurate estimate of the amount of savings actually incurred by the company. It 
also provides a more conservative estimate of the real differences in the time it took workers and 
supervisors to carry out indirect labor tasks. Using this conservative estimate, teams did in 64 
hours per month what the average supervisor did in 200 hours per month, a difference of 68 
percent. 
The Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
Finally, if teams do the work of supervisors in 68 percent less time, then the question is 
how are the economic benefits of teams distributed? In other words, if team members learn new 
skills and absorb supervisory tasks, who gains from the economic efficiencies of teams? To 
translate the hours of work analysis above into labour costs, I used average wage data for 
technicians and supervisors because real wage data was not available for proprietary reasons. In 
this case, however, there is little variation in wages except for that associated with overtime 
hours. This is because the union contract sets one hourly wage grade for field technicians; wage 
rates vary only by seniority, with employees reaching the highest grade after 5 years of service. 
Because this study involves employees who average 22 years of service, with a standard 
deviation of 5, there is little variation in wages based on seniority. Variation in earnings, 
therefore, is based almost entirely on variation in work hours. Labour costs for service 
technicians averaged $23.80 per hour in 1995 (loaded estimate including 36% for benefits). The 
hourly overtime rate was $26.25 (one and a half times the hourly pay of $17.50). For 
supervisors, the average total cost of wages and benefits of was $73,497 in 1995 (a mid point 
average salary of $47,000 plus 36% loading for the costs of benefits). The average $7,000 in 
overtime pay brings the average total costs per supervisor to $80,497 annually. 
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Table 5 presents the estimates of labour cost savings associated with teams in this case. 
The costs of additional work hours among team members is estimated at 2 hours of straight time 
(lost direct labour @ $17.50 per hour) plus 6 hours of overtime per member per month. 
Assuming that the average size of teams is 8, additional costs for teams for the employer 
included 16 hours of straight time per month and 48 hours of over time. The first set of 
calculations in Table 5 shows that the employer saved $60,780 in indirect labour costs per team 
per year. The second set of calculations shows that the employer shared the savings with team 
members -- the employer kept 75.5% of the indirect cost savings while employees received the 
remaining 24.5% through longer work hours and overtime pay. This overtime pay represents an 
annual wage premium for team members of 4.12 percent over the average base plus overtime pay 
of $45,850 received by a typical technician under traditional supervision. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
At the organisational level, total indirect cost savings associated with the team system 
would depend on the percentage of technicians that shifts to self-management. In this case, the 
team system covered only 5% of the technician workforce, but 32% of the survey respondents in 
traditional groups said they would volunteer for the program if given the opportunity. There 
were over 3,000 first-line supervisors in network operations at the time of the study. If one-third 
of the workforce shifted to teams, then reductions of roughly one-third of the supervisory 
workforce would be possible. In this case, eliminating 1,000 supervisors would result in savings 
of roughly $60 million in annual indirect labour costs. 
A potential confound to this study is selection bias because participation in teams was 
voluntary. Technicians as a group would vote to become a self-managed team. It is plausible 
that those who volunteered were already assuming responsibilities of co-ordination and 
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monitoring -- in other words, it was the individual characteristics of the volunteers, rather than 
the work design per se that made a difference. One way to consider this issue is to analyse the 
characteristics of current volunteers for the teams. That is, while there was no opportunity for 
pre-post test data in this study, I included a survey question asking whether technicians currently 
under traditional supervision would volunteer for teams if given the opportunity. Using this 
variable, I redid the analyses in Tables 2, 3, and 4 above, substituting team volunteer for team 
member. Volunteering had no significant relationship to the variables in question. Similarly, I 
compared early and later forming teams on the hunch that the early volunteers had more 
enthusiasm or initiative; I again found no significant differences along the dimensions of interest. 
Also, in surveys conducted of supervisors and managers, I asked whether technicians' 
performance was a criteria in the approval of self-managed teams, and the overwhelming 
response was negative. 
In summary, the empirical evidence in this case shows that the primary benefits of self-
managed teams among field technicians are in labour efficiencies associated with the integration 
of direct and indirect labour tasks and the elimination of supervisors. Team members did the 
work of co-ordination and monitoring in 68 percent less time than did traditional supervisors, 
and did so without adversely affecting other performance measures. 
This quantitative evidence also supports the findings from field research with respect to 
the main effects of the team initiative. In field interviews, I asked technicians in teams how 
formal teams affected the way they worked. The typical response was to focus on the additional 
tasks they had to do -- not on the content of the technical work itself, which remained largely 
unchanged. For example, 
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"What's the difference between before and after the self-managed team?....not a whole lot. 
Now, the deadlines fall on us rather than on someone else. We work and live around here so 
the customers are our friends. Now, if we do something right, we get the credit -- like the job 
on highway 531. But we have to deal with customer complaints too… And we have a lot 
more paper work to do…. We also order all our supplies. If we need cable, we see to it that 
it's here" (Interview 46, 3/29/93). 
These findings raise the question of whether the additional hours of overtime in the teams 
represents time actually worked, or whether team members were padding their work hours to get 
more overtime pay. This study cannot resolve that question since it is not possible to assess 
whether the additional 64 hours per team per month was a reasonable amount of time to 
accomplish indirect labour tasks. The relevant comparison, however, is with the supervisors' 
work time; and it is equally plausible that supervisors took advantage of their position to pad 
their own overtime hours. The analysis shows that the teams were at least two-thirds more 
efficient than the supervisors. 
A final question is whether the supervisory structure provides other benefits to the 
organisation that teams cannot provide. In this case, there was no information in field interviews 
to support this idea. Supervisors who became coaches of teams increased their span of control 
(overseeing teams plus traditional groups), and spent more time on coaching or training. Some 
managers in field interviews, however, complained about one downside of teams that was 
unrelated to the presence or absence of the supervisor per se. The issue was less labour 
flexibility. Because teams were assigned to manage their own territory of a given region, 
managers responsible for the whole geographic region were not allowed to re-allocate team 
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members from one territory to another, except in cases of extreme emergencies. I do not have 
the quantitative data to assess whether this issue was a widespread concern or not. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature on teams by examining the economic pay-off to teams in 
an occupation that is economically important but that has received little attention. The business 
case for teams of technicians appears to rest heavily on the system-level efficiencies gained 
through the alignment of the organisational structure with the informal work characteristics of 
the occupational community. The case demonstrates the value of research that examines the 
nature of teams and what they actually do in the context of specific occupations and industries. 
In this case, organisational efficiencies accrued from the specific use of self-managed teams, but 
not offline problem solving teams. Self-managed teams provide a mechanism for changing the 
vertical division of labour into a more horizontal one. Other types of team-based systems, such 
as such as offline or total quality problem-solving groups, tend to leave the supervisory structure 
in tact, and thus are unlikely to lead to savings in indirect labour costs. Some studies, for 
example, have shown that the role of supervisors actually increases under new forms of team-
based organisation, as in Lowe's (1993) study of Japanese-style lean production where team-
based work organisation exists, but in a highly supervised environment. Also, Hoffer-Gittell's 
(1996) study of the airline industry found that the co-ordinating role of supervisors increased 
with the use of cross-functional teams. Thus, while many advocates of teams assert that they 
facilitate the streamlining of bureaucratic organisations, this is likely to be true only in the case 
of teams that include significant levels of self-management or autonomy. 
The finding that technicians absorbed co-ordination and monitoring tasks without 
affecting objective performance is somewhat surprising from different theoretical points of view. 
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On the one hand, for those who believe that teams have powerful motivational affects, or that 
peer-group monitoring is more powerful than hierarchical monitoring, it is surprising there are 
no positive findings related to performance. In field interviews, for example, technicians in 
teams reported that they were more motivated to do preventative maintenance because they knew 
they would be the ones responsible for going returning to the site if problems were not corrected. 
If these changes in behaviour were extensive, they did not show up in the performance data. 
On the other hand, for those who worry about agency problems and workers shirking in 
the absence of supervisory monitoring, it is surprising that productivity did not fall. However, 
the literature on technicians provides a reasonable explanation -- that technicians' occupational 
identity is already their major source of work motivation. As Orr notes, "They [technicians] are 
focused on the work, not on the organisation, and the only valued status is that of full member of 
the community, that is, being considered a competent technician" (Orr 1996:76). In sum, the 
business case for teams among technicians rests more on system-level efficiencies than on good 
service, which technicians' own sense of pride at work inspires. 
Also, it is noteworthy that workers did share in at least a portion of the productivity gains 
associated with team efficiencies. Overtime was not mandatory because the self-managed team 
program was voluntary; and the teams had the option of returning to traditional supervision at 
any time, but only 7 teams of nearly 200 in the entire company did so. Alternatively, it could be 
that overtime pay was the payoff to technicians for assuming new tasks. Overtime pay was 
highly valued because it was the only opportunity for workers to earn higher wages; and equal 
opportunity for overtime pay was a perennial labour-management issue in this case, as in many 
others. Technicians in teams gained a modest pay premium as a share in the gains of a 
productivity-enhancing work innovation. The pay may also be viewed as a premium for learning 
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new skills. In the labour economics literature, for example, empirical research finds growing 
wage variation within occupational traditional groups, and associates that growth with skill-
biased technological change, broadly conceived. In this case, one could argue that the 
technology is the social technology of reorganising work, which changes the skill requirements 
of some jobs within an occupation and creates opportunities for greater wage variation within an 
otherwise homogenous group. 
The concepts and methodology from this study also are generalizable beyond technical 
workers. First, savings in indirect labour costs associated with self-managed are likely to exist 
for production workers in manufacturing and other settings; the empirical question is to estimate 
the magnitude of those savings. Second, the study demonstrates the value of a system-level 
approach. If teams in this case are evaluated only in terms of members' labour productivity and 
quality, then the experiment might be considered a failure; measured at the system level, 
however, the company accrued significant efficiencies. 
Third, this study suggests an approach to team research that incorporates an analysis of 
the economics of labour, a dimension of teams that has received little attention. While this study 
has focused on the incorporation of indirect tasks into the work of technicians, it appears that 
production-level workers are increasingly asked to co-ordinate and negotiate with suppliers 
and/or customers along the supply chain. Researchers have not examined how the incorporation 
of these tasks affects labour costs, hours of work, or the distribution of costs and benefits for 
firms and workers. This study provides a model for analysing direct and indirect labour as 
important components in the production system as a whole. Because data on work hours and 
labour costs must be kept for legal and accounting purposes, these data are reliable and 
accessible from management information systems. Researchers interested in organisational 
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change would find it relatively simple to incorporate hours of work and labour cost analyses into 
their performance models. This type of analysis provides a needed input for interpreting 
occupation-specific outcome measures that are increasingly used in empirical research on teams. 
Finally, hours of work and wage data also provide the opportunity to examine how work 
innovations affect the workloads and wages of employees, extrinsic outcomes that have received 
little attention. In the literature on participation and industrial performance, few empirical studies 
examine wage outcomes for employees. In general, then, the literature on teams would benefit 
from comparative studies that analyse the hours of work, labour costs, and wages associated with 
teams across a range of skill levels, occupational groups, and industrial settings. 
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TABLE 1 
Means of Variables: 

















Work Design and Technology 
SMT member 
Multi-skilling 
Technology (% new plant) 
Human Resource Practices 
Total quality group 
Formal training 
Supportive management 
Skill advancement opportunities 
Annual earnings 
Employment Relations 
Positive work group relations 



































































































* Teams and traditional groups are significantly different at: *** = p<.01; ** = .05; * = p< .10 
based on Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Means of Variables: 




Gender (% female) 
Race (% Caucasian) 
Company tenure (years) 
Education (years) 





































































































* Teams and traditional groups are significantly different at: *** = p<.01; ** = .05; * = p< .10, 
based on ANOVA. 
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TABLE 2 
Teams and the Execution of Supervisory Tasks 
Internal 
Co-ordination 



























































































Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Significant differences: *** = p < .01; ** = p < .05; * = p < .10, based on ANOVA. 
Controls for employment relations, demographic characteristics, and location not shown. 
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of Work Hours and Overtime 
Productive Overtime 
Hours/Mo. Hours/Mo. 








Skill advancement opportunities 







































Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Significant differences: *** = p < .01; ** = p < .05; * = p < .10. 




Determinants of Labour Productivity and Service Quality 








Skill advancement opportunities 



















































































Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Significant differences: *** = p < .01; ** = p < .05; * = p < .10 
Controls for employment relations, demographic characteristics and location not shown. 
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TABLE 5 
Estimated Labour Cost Savings Associated With Self-managed Teams 
Cost Category Costs and Benefits 
COMPANY SAVINGS: 




Annual costs of self-managed teams: 
Meeting and training time: 
16 hrs/mo @ $23.80/hr * 12mos. 
Overtime: 
48 hrs/mo @ $26.25/hr * 12 mos. 
Subtotal 










TEAM SHARE IN SAVINGS 
Team: annual overtime pay 15,120 
Company: savings per team 60,780 
Team pay as % of company savings 24.9 
INDIVIDUAL MEMBER SHARE 
Base pay: $17.50/hr * 2080 hrs/yr 
Regular overtime 
($26.25/hr*30 hrs/mo*12 mos/yr.) 
Annual pay 
Team-related overtime 
($26.25/hr * 6hrs/mo * 12 mos/yr.) 
Individual % increase in annual pay 
36,400 
9,450 
45,850 
1,890 
4.12 
40 
